The Impact of Risk on Insurance Demand and Adverse Selection in Specialist Physicians' Liability Insurance

Articles in Press

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Department of Economics, Faculty of Law and Economics, Khomeinishahr Branch, Islamic Azad University, Khomeinishahr, Iran.

2 Department of Economics, Faculty of Humanities and Law, Isfahan (Khorasgan) Branch, Islamic Azad University, Isfahan, Iran.

10.22103/jdc.2025.25217.1556

Abstract

Objective: This study investigates the impact of individual and professional risk levels of medical specialists on the demand for professional liability insurance and the potential emergence of adverse selection. It further analyzes the role of factors such as litigation history, work experience, specialty type, environmental conditions, and awareness of insurance regulations in shaping purchasing decisions and the intensity of adverse selection.
 
Method: A systematic review of the relevant literature was conducted to identify existing research gaps concerning physicians’ liability insurance and the influence of risk levels on insurance purchasing decisions. Data were collected from articles published between 2000 and 2024 in PubMed, Web of Science, Scopus, and Google Scholar. Analyses focused on determinants of insurance demand and mechanisms underlying adverse selection.
 
Results: The results indicate that specialists in high-risk fields such as surgery and anesthesiology, physicians with less professional experience, those with a litigation history, or those practicing in areas with high complaint rates are more likely to purchase comprehensive policies, reflecting the occurrence of adverse selection. Moreover, awareness of legal frameworks, contractual terms, and prior interactions with insurance companies were also found to influence insurance choices.
 
Conclusion: By emphasizing the role of individual and professional risk levels and the phenomenon of adverse selection, this study highlights the necessity of more precise policy design in the professional liability insurance market. The findings provide a foundation for more informed policymaking and improved contract structures between physicians and insurers, ultimately enhancing insurance market efficiency and the quality of healthcare services.

Keywords

Main Subjects

References

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Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 22 December 2025

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  • Receive Date: 13 May 2025
  • Revise Date: 12 August 2025
  • Accept Date: 26 August 2025

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